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 Financial transmission right (FTR) is an important tool and an especially feature for 
stopping congestion charges in restructured electricity markets. Participants in the transmission 
market as players are assumed to be a generation company (Gencos) which also take part in an 
energy market and able to buy their require FTRs. In this regard, there are two types of FTR: 
obligation or option. There are three main questions which immediately arise for each player 
who is placed in the market. First, which type of FTR is the best choice? second, how much 
power is needed to generate by each player and third, how bid prices should be offered. 
Deciding on these trade-offs is difficult and requires definition of special matrices to measure 
risk in each possible condition in the transmission market. These matrices include: possibility of 
flow direction alteration, probable forward and reverse power flow on each line, maximum and 
minimum offering FTRs and the worst condition of load variation which influence on each 
player’s decision. Based on these matrices, players try to maximize their expected payoffs by 
taking into account the associated risks. Supposing these matrices are known to respective 
players, the FTR bidding problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization based on the Nash 
equilibrium game theory with the upper sub-problem representing player profit maximization 
and the lower sub-problem representing the optimal solution to the market clearing. An eight-
bus system with six players is simulated to verify the proposed method and the obtained results 
are illustrated the complex interaction between FTR obligation and FTR option bidding 
strategies. Furthermore, the results are demonstrated to be consistent between the impacts of 
FTR type, forecasted bid offer of the other players and player’s preferred risk levels on FTR 
bidding strategies. FTR obligation and option, Optimal bidding, Risk concept, New transmission 
market formulation, Nash equilibrium point, Game theory, transmission market complexities.   
 
 
1  Introduction 
  With a long-term view of energy markets, there are complementary markets to hedge 
transmission charges including loss and congestion. Definition of locational marginal price (LMP) 
based congestion management schemes [1]−[3] is served by competitive transmission markets 
and organized wholesale electricity markets run by independent operator system [4]−[6]. In 
other word, a linear’s limitation restricts the amount of transmission power flow which leads to 
diversity in energy nodal prices. Therefore, load buses can pay more than the marginal costs of 
generation buses. These extra payments motivated the initial idea to form transmission markets. 
Through this market, participants could hold rights for use of transmission lines through the 
purchase of financial transmission rights (FTRs). FTR are a sold right which can hedge congestion 
charges over the constrained transmission routes [7]−[9]. Generally, there are two kinds of FTRs 
regarding the energy pricing methodology. The first type is called point to point FTR in which the 
holder must specify a path between two nodes (source and sink) and amount of his required 
power. This method is executed in many markets such as PJM and New England [10] and [11]. 
The revenue from FTR holding is calculated as the product of the difference between sources and 
sinks LMPs and the amount of owned FTR. The latter type is flow gate FTR which is used in 
decentralized markets. This method is based on zonal marginal pricing in which the FTR owner 
has the authority to keep special capacity in reserve and planning preference to use links or flow 
gates between zones [12]. Unlike the first type, owner of flow gate FTR may or may not use it. It 
is therefore a kind of option. Since this method is not commonly used in of transmission markets 
[13], it is not considered in this paper. Point to point FTRs (or just FTRs) are generally categorized 
in two parts; obligation and option [14]−[16]. A FTR obligation holder receives positive profit if 
the LMP difference between source and sink is positive. In the reverse situation, he would earn 
negative profit. Therefore, a FTR obligation is a kind liability for its owner. On the other hand, FTR 
option guarantees positive profit for its owner and when the LMP at the sink is higher than at the 
source negative profit would not be imposed to the holder. This feature makes FTR option more 
expensive since risk of negative revenue is neglected. Thus it can be that, given the same price 
condition for both options an obligation, a FTR option is more preferable. The owner of FTR 
obligation when the nodal price in the injection point is higher than its value in the withdrawal 
point must pay an amount. This means that, FTR obligation can be a liability for holders while FTR 
option will never be in the form of liability [17]. FTR option will be distinct from FTR obligation in 
several concepts [18]: 
1- Simultaneously feasibility test (SFT) is much more difficult for FTR option. After 
receiving the FTR offers from the market participants, ISO has tendency to maximize revenue 
from tender on the SFT condition for the congestion and transfer capacity constraints. The aim 
of SFT is in fact guaranteeing that the gathered congestion charges by ISO from the energy market 
is not less than the payments to FTR holders under expected and normal congestion performance 
conditions. The SFT problem by considering FTR obligation is comparable with the security 
constrained economic dispatch problem. Known algorithms related to the security constrained 
economic dispatch (SCED) exist; however, because FTR option of the ISOs SFT problem will be 
required for finding the worst combination of the optimization FTR options for each constraints, 
it becomes more complex. 
2- Only a subset of feasible FTR obligations can exist if they are awarded as FTR options. 
Several papers about ISOs FTR option tender market have been discussed. The specific 
formulas of FTR obligations and options have been presented by using load models dc and ac in 
[19]. Energy and tender hybrid market has been proposed in [20]. Market participants could 
accordingly obtain the FTRs along with energy trading. Since energy and transmission markets 
significantly influence each other, impacts of energy markets on transmission markets and the 
reverse is regarded in many papers. In [20] and [21] a joint energy and transmission market is 
analyzed and optimal joint bids and corresponding FTRs are calculated. On the other hand, 
impact of transmission market on energy participation is discussed in [22]− [25]. In these 
references, the effect of transmission rights on market power is discussed. It is shown that players 
in energy market that are located in generating buses can exert market power by purchasing 
FTRs, while players in demand buses don’t have such an opportunity.  
In this paper, the focus is on FTR pricing strategies development in the tender markets. 
During the time of participation in the FTR tender, the bidders will provide the following 
information for the sale of a specific amount of FTR, which are maximum amount of FTR, bid 
price and the points of power injection and delivery. The bidders must make their decisions based 
on the system predicted performance conditions during holding the FTRs. Specifically, they will 
need that the LMP differences between source points and sinks over a specified FTR route be 
also considered. Furthermore, powerful competitors and their corresponding pricing information 
must also be identified. The methods of predicting the electricity price are price simulation 
method [26], and numerical methods such as artificial neural networks (ANN) [26],[27], time 
series method [28] and machine learning method [29]. In this paper, it has been assumed that 
the LMPs have been predicted by using one of the existing methods. Any goal bidding FTR is after 
maximizing its expected use for holding FTR. Because of the fluctuations of electricity markets, 
the results of pricing FTR are in fact trade-off between the predicted profit resulting from holding 
FTR and the risk related to holding a FTR. The risk related to holding a FTR in a bidding object 
function with risk coefficients has been included. The bidders have information about their 
objective functions and risk references, but no information on their competitors risk preferences. 
So, each bidder tries to find the LMPs and their competitor predicted risk references based on 
historical bidding information and anticipated bidding information under the system 
performance conditions. It is necessary for the exact modelling of the competitor’s special 
information which can directly affect the incomes of the FTR in the market, to be at the bidder’s 
disposal. Subsequently, the problem of pricing FTR with incomplete information has been 
formulated as a two surface optimization problem in this paper. The above surface sub-problem 
states the problem of maximizing the pricing utilities for holding a FTR and the below surface sub-
problem also shows the FTR market settlement problem for ISO with the aim of maximizing the 
incomes obtained from FTR tender while keeping the system convergence. 
 
1.1  Problem Statement 
 In this paper the problem is analyzed from the point of view of a joint participant in 
energy and transmission markets. It implies that the player as a generator should take part in 
transmission market as well and guarantees his required power in transmission system. Energy 
markets are discussed in many different references and are not the subject of this paper but the 
effect of the energy market have to be regarded as a main point in the decision making process. 
Modeling an energy market (using DCOPF), parameters which could be estimated are: dispatched 
power by generators, energy prices and power flow in each line. Using any other procedure to 
predict these parameters does not influence the major questions facing each participant in 
transmission market. Briefly they could be categorized as three main parts in the following; 
a) Which lines should be chosen as FTR obligation and which ones might be bought as 
option? 
b) How much bid should be presented for each path from each player in transmission 
market? 
c) How much power should be bought? 
The first two questions, which constitute definitions of new metrics, are answered in 
section II and the last question is solved in section III. To sum up these three questions in section 
IV and objective function with its constraints is presented and using game theory the Nash 
equilibrium is obtained. Finally, the results are presented in section V on a test case system. 
 
2  CHOOSING FTRs AS OBLIGATION OR OPTION AND 
CORRESPONDING OFFERING PRICES 
 As declared before, in this paper the problem would be regarded from a Genco’s view 
in the transmission market. This section aims to define the conditions which motivate a player to 
select a FTR obligation or option. Therefore, for this purpose a decision function is introduced 
which enables each participant to determine the weather, for each path, an obligation or option 
should be purchased. 
Suppose based on 𝑖𝑡ℎ player’s estimation from energy market, the flow in line between 
node 𝑙 and 𝑘 is 𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 . Therefore Player 𝑖, has to consider all other player’s influence on the 
line flow between node 𝑙 and 𝑘 (this includes himself as well). Mathematically speaking line 
flow sensitivity for dispatching each generation unit, is a significant parameter for player 𝑖 and 
is as below; 
 
 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗 =
𝜕𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑗
 (1) 
 
In (1) there is a missing issue which has to be considered and that refers to load deviations. 
In (1) flow sensitivity to generation unit 𝑗, is stated but the loads supplied by generator 𝑗 in the 
event of its dispatch must be considered. Therefore it can be written as; 
 
 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑 =
𝜕𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑑 = 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑 = 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑙−𝑘
𝑗−𝑑
 (2) 
 
In (2), 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑
 shows line (𝑙 − 𝑘) sensitivity while generator 𝑗 dispatches to supply load 
𝑑. In fact, it shows impact of generator 𝑗 on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 when it supports load 𝑑. If there are 
𝑁𝑑 loads in the network, the simplest way to model the probability of them is to use a probability 
distribution function. Thus if for load d changing probability is considered 𝑤𝑑 , it would be clear 
that; 
 
 ∑𝑁𝑑𝑑=1 𝑤
𝑑 = 1 (3) 
 
Now it can be stated that the expected amount of change in the line between nodes 𝑙 
and 𝑘 when the load d deviation is Δ𝐷𝑑  and there is only generator 𝑗 to supply demand, 
would be as below; (considering any probability distribution function for load 𝑑) 
 
 𝐸(𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑 ) = 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑 Δ𝐷𝑑𝑤
𝑑 (4) 
 
But here is an extraordinarily significant issue which is concerned with the energy market 
and network constraints. When load d changes, based on energy market estimation and by 
considering limits of transmission lines, output power of each generator can increase or 
decrease, therefore changes in the network are resulted from these two factors. Mathematically 
speaking Δ𝐷𝑑 = ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 Δ𝑃𝑗  in which Δ𝑃𝑗  can be positive or negative. If probabilities for 
increment and reduction in load 𝑑, are assumed to be 𝜔𝑑
+, 𝜔𝑑
− , respectively, and change in 
generator 𝑗 output in response of these load deviations, are considered to be Δ𝑃𝑗
𝑑+ and Δ𝑃𝑗
𝑑−  
then the expected effect of load d on line between nodes 𝑙 and 𝑘 for all condition in network 
is as follows; 
 
 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑 = 𝑤𝑑(𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1 + 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2 ) (5) 
 In (5), 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1  and 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2  are respectively as below; 
 
 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1 = ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 𝜔𝑑
+ ∗ 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑 ∗ Δ𝑃𝑗
𝑑+  (6) 
  
 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2 = ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 𝜔𝑑
− ∗ 𝜓′𝑙−𝑘
𝑗,𝑑 ∗ Δ𝑃𝑗
𝑑−  (7) 
 
It must be noted that 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1  and 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2  can be positive (𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1+, 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2+)  or negative 
(𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1−, 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2−). As mentioned in (3) to model load probability the simplest way is to use probability 
distribution for each load, but this is not the best way to consider the worst situation of 
transmission market. Indeed if a player in market wants to model the problem with the most 
conservative view, he must assume that unwanted situations are more probable. In this problem, 
the situation in which the expected negative flow (reverse flow) for the line between node 𝑙 and 
𝑘 is increased would be unwanted. Therefore probabilities for each load can be obtained from 
(8). 
 
 𝑤𝑑 =
(
 
 
𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1−+𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2−
∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1−+𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2−
  if𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 0
𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1++𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2+
∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1 𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑1++𝑙𝑙−𝑘
𝑑2+
  if𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 < 0
 (8) 
 
The expected effect of generator 𝑗 on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 can be positive or negative. Based on 
these two conditions, two different parameters are introduced as below; 
 
 𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘 = ∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑+  , 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑+ ∈ {𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑  | 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑 > 0} (9) 
  
 𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘 = ∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑−  , 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑− ∈ {𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑  | 𝜑′𝑙−𝑘
𝑑 < 0} (10) 
 
Coefficients in (9) and (10) are respectively called forward potential flow and reverse 
potential flow on the line between nodes l and k. The first coefficient has the same direction as 
the line power flow and the second one is in the opposite direction. These coefficients show the 
expected amount of power flow in the forward and reverse direction of each given line. 
Considering these coefficients significantly improves decision making regarding buying FTRs as 
obligations or options. Suppose the estimated power flow on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 is 𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 , then there are 
two conditions; 
a) 𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘 > |𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘|: In this circumstance the main idea coming to mind is that 
flow direction alteration is not probable. Mathematically, flow increment potential in forward 
direction is more than flow changing direction potential. Therefore it is more reasonable to buy 
FTR as obligation, because obligation FTR is less expensive and more preferred to buy. 
b) 𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘 ≤ |𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘|: In this manner, in spite of previous state, flow return 
probability is more than its increment in forward direction. It is brilliantly inferred that in this 
condition risk of purchasing FTR obligation is high and unavoidable. Choosing FTR option may 
solve risk of earning negative profit. 
Based on two abovementioned conditions, chance coefficients are defined as below; 
 
 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 =
𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘+𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘+𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡+|𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘|
 (11) 
  
 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 =
|𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘|
𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘+𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡+|𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑙−𝑘|
 (12) 
 
In (11) 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓
 shows probability that power flow on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 keeps its direction, while 
𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟  in (12) represents probability of an inversion of the flow direction. For instance suppose 
that for line 𝑙 − 𝑘 these two parameters are; 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 = 0.8, 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 = 0.2. This means that it is 80 
percent probable that the power flow remains in its current direction and the probability of 
inversion is 20 percent. In this condition as a player in transmission market if based on your 
estimation difference between nodal prices of line 𝑙 − 𝑘 is 1 
$
𝑀𝑊ℎ
 then which price do you 
offer to market for FTR obligation and what about FTR option? To help answer these two 
questions chance coefficients and estimated nodal price differences are excellent metrics. In 
other words by using these three factors the questions are answered. Since load centers are 
integrated far from generation units and Energy flows from generators to load places in the 
network, it can be assumed that 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 > 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 . Regardless of load or generation places a loss-
benefit analysis should be done to Earn maximum limit of prices for each kinds of FTR. Hence two 
types are FTRs are divided as below: 
a) Selecting line 𝑙 − 𝑘 as FTR obligation: under this assumption the expected profit by 
considering 𝑝𝑙−𝑘, 𝑖 MW to buy is as shown in (13); 
 
 𝐸(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) = 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖(Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 ) (13) 
 And expected loss value is as in (14);  
 𝐸(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) = 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖(Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 ) (14) 
 
Player 𝑖 always foloww the rule that keeps 𝐸(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) > 𝐸(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) and it means that 
proposed bid must be as below; 
 
 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < (2𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡  (15) 
 
b) Selecting line l-k as FTR option: as before player i expected profit is like (13) but 
expected loss is as equation (16). Note that in case of choosing FTR option, because it is not 
associated with negative profit caused by flow direction changing, the only loss is the payment 
that player i expends to buy FTR option; 
 
 𝐸(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) = 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 𝑝 𝑙 − 𝑘(𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 ) (16) 
 Therefore offered bid for FTR option is grabbed as (17); 
 
 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡  (17) 
 
According to abovementioned points the decision function for player i could be written 
as below; 
 
 
𝐷𝐹𝑖 = [(2𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 ]𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 +
[𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡]𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡  (18) 
 
In the next section (18) is modified to consider the required amount of power for player i 
which is a Genco and is responsible for its power flow in lines.  
3  ESTIMATION OF REQUIRED POWER 
 After choosing the FTR type(obligation or option) and their prices, a player (Genco) in 
transmission market must determine the required power of the selected FTR. To determine this 
a player in joint transmission and energy markets needs to know about his power flow on each 
line after clearing the energy market. There are many methods describing how to calculate each 
generator contribution on lines but in this paper the distribution factors method, as common 
method, is selected. If 𝐷𝑙−𝑘 is generation distribution factor for player 𝑖 then his share on line 
𝑙 − 𝑘 would be as below [26]; 
 
 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 = 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑖𝑝𝑖 (19) 
 
To consider other generators′ effects on  𝑡ℎ player′s share, a new sensitivity factor is 
defined as below; 
 
 𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑 =
𝜕𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑑  (20) 
 
In (20), 𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑
 represents sensitivity of  𝑡ℎ player’s share on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 with respect to 
 𝑡ℎ generator produced power changes to supply load d. Extending equation (20) reaches to 
(21). It must be regarded that generator 𝑖  output power is independent from generator 𝑗 
production and consequently the second term in (21) is zero as it can be seen; 
  
𝜂 =
𝜕𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑑 𝑝𝑖 +
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝜂 =
𝜕𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑑 𝑝𝑖
 (21) 
 since; 
 
 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 = 𝐷𝑙 − 𝑘, 𝑠𝑙 + 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 (22) 
 
And generalized shift factor 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 is dependent on network configuration and slack bus, 
not the condition of network, then (21) could be approximated as follow; 
 
 𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑 =
𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1 −𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡
Δ𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑖 (23) 
 
To calculate , see appendix A. 
After calculation of 𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑
 , expected amount of alteration in share of 𝑖 𝑡ℎ  player (or 
Genco) while generator 𝑗  changes its output power to supply load 𝑑  is as below (load 
deviation is Δ𝑝𝑗); 
 
 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑 = (𝜔𝑑
+𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑 Δ𝑝𝑗
𝑑+ + 𝜔𝑑
−𝜂𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑 Δ𝑝𝑗
𝑑−) (24) 
 
In (24) the first term is indexed as 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑
 and the second one is . Because deviation in 
load d may cause other players in energy market to modify their generation, therefore, expected 
influence of load d on 𝑖𝑡ℎ player contribution on line between nodes 𝑙 and 𝑘 is represented 
as follow; 
 
 𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑 = 𝑤′𝑑 ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑1 + 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2  (25) 
 
The same idea like (8) is posed here to obtain the worst situation for player i. In fact the 
cases in which the most reverse effect (negative effect) on 𝑖𝑡ℎ player’s contribution are higher, 
are meant to be more probable. Considering 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1 = ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑1
 , 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2 = ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑗=1 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗,𝑑2
 and 
𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1+  , 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2+  for positive and 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1−  , 𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2−  for negative values, therefore 𝑤′𝑑  in (25) is 
calculated as below; 
 
 𝑤′𝑑 =
(
 
 
𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1− +𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2−
∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1− +𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2−
𝑖𝑓    𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 > 0
𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1+ +𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2+
∑
𝑁𝑑
𝑑=1𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑1+ +𝜒𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑2+
𝑖𝑓    𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 < 0
 (26) 
 
Again potential coefficients are applied here but this time in form of forward contribution 
potential (FCP) and reverse contribution potential (RCP) coefficients; 
  𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 = ∑
𝑛𝑑
𝑑=1 𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑+   , 𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑+ ∈ {𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗 |𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑗 > 0} (27) 
  
 𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 = ∑
𝑛𝑑
𝑑=1 𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑−   , 𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑− ∈ {𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑 |𝜈𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑑 > 0} (28) 
 
In (27), 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖  represents expected flow (MW) that intensifies share of player 𝑖, while 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖  in (28) is expected amount of power (mw) which reduces player 𝑖 contribution on line 
𝑙 − 𝑘. Using these two coefficients makes two possible states. These possibilities are respectively 
as follows; 
1) 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 > |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |: In this case, it can be inferred that chance of increment in share 
of player 𝑖  is more than its decrement. Therefore if he tends to buy 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖  as his required 
power, he is exposed to risk that his share would be more than 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 and consequently he has 
to pay extra cost equal to (29) to compensate its probable extra power flow on line 𝑙 − 𝑘. 
 
 (𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡  (29) 
 
thus in this condition its total profit would be as (30); 
 
 
𝑅𝑖 = (𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 − (𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |)) ×
Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖𝜋𝑙−𝑘
 (30) 
 
In (30), 𝜋𝑙−𝑘 stand for either FTR obligation or FTR option price. 
2) 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 > |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |: This situation approves that the amount of 𝑖𝑡ℎ player’s share, 
possibly decreases and this means that he has bought power more than he needs. Under this 
condition he is entailed the rule of use it or loss it since there is no secondary market to sell his 
extra amount of power. In other word, he pays extra money for the power that he doesn’t use. 
The imposed cost to him is stated in (31). 
 
 (|𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 | − 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 )𝜋𝑙−𝑘 (31) 
 Based on (31), in this circumstance his profit is; 
 
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − [𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 + |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 | − 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 ]𝜋𝑙−𝑘 (32) 
 
According to abovementioned points, 𝑖𝑡ℎ player’s FTR on line 𝑙 − 𝑘 would be definitely 
within below interval; 
 
 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 | < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 < 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖  (33) 
 
In (33), 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡  represents the estimated amount of player’s share on line 𝑙 − 𝑘, gained 
by energy market simulation. At last regarding both possible states, by combining (30) and (32) 
the final profit function is presented in (34). 
 
 
𝑅𝑖
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 −𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |))
Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 −𝑚𝑖𝑛(0, 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |)) 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
 (34) 
 
 
4  NEW FORMULATION FOR TRANSMISSION MARKET 
 So far the three main questions posed in part I section A, have been answered 
separately. In this section the FTR bidding problem as an optimization problem with a new 
formulation is introduced. It should be noted that the optimization variables are respectively; a 
set of binary variables representing the choice of FTR obligation or option for each path, the 
amount of power required for each line and finally the proposed price for the required FTR. 
Before presenting the objective function, two parameters are defined as positive FTR in (35) and 
negative FTR in (36). 
 
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
+ = 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 −𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |) (35) 
  
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
− = 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 −𝑚𝑖𝑛(0, 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 |) (36) 
 
Based on (18) and (34) objective function for this problem its associated constraints are 
presented in (37) to (40). 
 
 
𝑜𝑏𝑗 =
[𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0,
𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑓
−𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑟
|𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑓
−𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑟 |
) ×
((2𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
+𝑜𝑏𝑙) − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
−𝑜𝑏𝑙]
+[𝜉𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
+𝑜𝑝𝑡 − 𝜋𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡]
 (37) 
 Subject to; 
 
 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖 | < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑙−𝑘,𝑖 < 𝑝𝑙−𝑘,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖  (38) 
  
 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙,𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < (2𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡  (39) 
  
 (2𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝜁𝑙−𝑘
𝑓 Δ𝜆𝑙−𝑘
𝑒𝑠𝑡  (40) 
  
4.1  ISO Problem 
 To solve the optimization problem in (37)-(40), first it is needed to solve ISO market 
clearing price to obtain allocated FTRs and corresponding prices which is mentioned in [30] as 
below; 
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙
𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 (41) 
 S.T.  
 𝑝𝑙−𝑘 = ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑀𝑖)𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 (42) 
  
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑜𝑏𝑙 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑜𝑏𝑙  𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙  (43) 
  
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑜𝑝𝑡  𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡 (44) 
 
Therefore, each player has to solve ISO problem at first and it means that players have to 
deal with a bi-level optimization problem as below; 
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑖
S. T.
𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙,𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑏𝑙,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝜌𝑙−𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚
 (45) 
  
4.2  Game Theory 
 To solve the bi-level problem in (45), there are methods such as branch and bound, 
steepest decent direction and heuristic techniques which can be applied. In this paper by using 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions the problem is changed to a single level 
optimization (see appendix B) and all player’s bids are obtained by solving that. In fact all players 
are assumed to compete in a game theory problem and the by solving the below equations all 
bids are computed simultaneously. However one can solve the problem serially. It means that 
player i by considering initial bids for other players, can update his bid until there are no more 
changes in his bid. Sequentially after that the player j would follow this procedure and this would 
be repeated by all players until anyone doesn’t change his bid. But as it mentioned, here all bids, 
are obtained in parallel by executing the following optimization problem; 
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑖=1
∑
𝑁𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ
𝑗=1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0,
𝜁𝑗
𝑓
−𝜁𝑗
𝑟
|𝜁
𝑗
𝑓
−𝜁𝑗
𝑟|
) ((2𝜁𝑗
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑏𝑙 −
𝜋𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑏𝑙) + (𝜁𝑗
𝑓Δ𝜆𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅 + 𝑗, 𝑖+𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝜋𝑗
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡)
 (46) 
 
Subject to quality constraint of ISO problem which is: 
 
 𝑝𝑗 =
∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖
𝑗𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑀𝑖)𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ
 (47) 
 KKT Optimality consition for 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑜𝑏𝑙; 
 
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖  (48) 
  
 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑏𝑙 = 0 (49) 
 KKT Optimality condition for 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑜𝑝𝑡; 
 
 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖  (50) 
  
 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0 (51) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙  and 𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡  are slack variables. KKT optimality condition for 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑜𝑏𝑙 <
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 and 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 respectively are; 
 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑏𝑙(𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖| − 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0 (52) 
  
 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 + |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖| − 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0 (53) 
 
Lagrangian function for ISO problem is presented in (54) as below; 
 
 
𝐿 = ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙
𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 +
𝜇𝑗
𝑒𝑞(𝑝𝑙−𝑘 − (∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑏𝑙
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 + ∑
𝑁𝑝
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑀𝑖)𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡))
+𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑏𝑙(𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 − 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖) +
𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖) +
𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑏𝑙(𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖| − 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡) +
𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝑒𝑠𝑡 − |𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
𝑖| − 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡)
 (54) 
 
Optimality condition for 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 and 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐹𝑇𝑅
𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 implies that; 
 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑏𝑙 + 𝜌𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 −𝑀𝑖
𝑗𝜇𝑗
𝑒𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑏𝑙 = 0 (55) 
  
 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
+𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝜌𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 −𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑀𝑖)𝜇𝑗
𝑒𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗,𝑖
−𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0 (56) 
 Finally bid constraints respectively are; 
 
 𝜌𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑙,𝑏𝑎𝑠 ≤ 𝜌𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑏𝑙 ≤ (2𝜁𝑗
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑡 (57) 
  
 (2𝜁𝑗
𝑓 − 1)Δ𝜆𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝜌𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝜁𝑗
𝑓Δ𝜆𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑡 (58) 
 
To solve above mentioned optimization every heuristic and Meta-heuristic method can 
be applied. In this paper interior-point algorithm is implemented [31]. The answer of optimization 
problem is Nash equilibrium in which optimal bids, amount of FTRs and their types (option or 
obligation) are obtained. In next section results for proposed method on test network is 
presented.  
5  Results 
 To verify the proposed method an 8 bus network is considered here. Network data can 
be found in [32]. It should be noted that the capacity of line 10 is restricted to 9 MW. Fig. 1, shows 
the network with six players taking part in the transmission market (remember that the players 
are assumed to participate in a joint energy and transmission market).  
   
Figure  1: Test system with 8 buses and 6 generators 
   To model the competition between six players, five paths are considered here, 
including line 1, 2, 8, 10 and 11. Load variation is considered to be 10 percent for each one. Values 
for 𝜁𝑗
𝑓
 are listed in table 1. As it can be seen, power flow on line 8 has the most potential to 
change among rest of paths and flow on line 10 is the least probable to alter. In other word line 
8 is not suitable for buying FTR obligation while line 10 seems to be a safe option to buy FTR 
obligation.   
Table  1: Values of 𝜁𝑗
𝑓
 for Selected Paths 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
𝜁𝑗
𝑓
 0.9113 0.7161 0.4947 0.9139 0.802 
 
  
Table 2 shows values of FCP and RCP (MW) for each player on selected paths. The table 
shows that in line 1, the greatest change is related to player 1 in the reverse direction. In fact, 
table 2 gives an initial view to each player about his required share. For example according to 
(18), first player’s contribution on line 1 is 9.7966 MW but by considering table 2, he could 
possibly reduce his share to 7.9503 MW. Clearly, if he buys all his contribution (9.7966 MW) in 
transmission market, he would be required to ′𝑢𝑠𝑒  𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑖𝑡′ because his share 
would be less than 9.7966 actually based on table 2. This is reverse for him on line 8. Because 
based on table 2, his share would increase about 3.1742 MW and this declares that he has to buy 
more than his actual share.   
Table  2: FCP and RCP of Players for Each Line 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
1 0 0 3.1742 0 1.7990 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
1 -7.9503 -6.1861 0 -3.1254 0 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
2 0.2801 0.0649 0.2137 0.1177 0.5559 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
2 0 0 0 0 0 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
3 0.2210 0.3604 0.1889 0.3874 0.0093 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
3 -0.2526 -0.3160 -0.1656 -0.4419 -0.0081 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
4 2.8120 1.8102 0 1.3634 0 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
4 0 0 -0.1941 0 -0.6388 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
5 3.8437 2.7283 4.6066 1.7084 0 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
5 0 0 0 0 -0.8964 
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑗
6 0.0365 0.2022 0.1424 0.3033 0.1462 
𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗
6 -0.0755 -0.0976 -0.0688 -0.6282 -0.3027 
 
 
  
To simulate players’ behaviors in the transmission market as a game and choosing their 
decisions about FTR obligation or option, two states are considered. These two states are the 
worst conditions that each player may encounter. First it is supposed that all players select all 
paths as obligation. in this condition, each participant who bids more would be in the set of 
winners. Second, it is assumed that all players offer bids as option. When all players take a special 
path as option, it means that, market clearing price would be more than same situation selecting 
as obligation. Better to say if from all 6 generators on the transmission market, only one 
generator bids as obligation, his chance to earn FTR is least, since his proposed bid is clearly less 
than others. Table 3 shows players’ profits ($/MWh) in these two situations. Nash equilibrium 
points for each player on each path, are bolted. Regarding output results, it is better for player 1 
to buy FTR on line 1 as option because his profit when he chooses option is more than obligation. 
This is true for line 2 and 8 also. The same analysis can be done for other players. 
Optimal bids for players considering each of two above mentioned states are listed in 
table 4. Proposed bids for options are more than bids for obligations and this is because of FTR 
option inherence which is more expensive and less risky based on (44). Market clearing prices for 
both option and obligation FTRs are also collected in table 5. 
Allocated FTRs in each state are drawn in table 6. Since flow direction of line 8 possibly 
changes, no one would buy FTR on line 8 as obligation. Contribution of Player 1 in line 1 and 2 
when he selects them as FTR option has increased. Looking at table 4, declares that despite of 
bid increment for player 1 on line 1 and 2 (consequently MCP increment for option), increment 
in his FTR option and reduction in risk makes him to pick these two lines as option (based on table 
3). But on line 11, allocated FTR to him by choosing obligation is more and since market clearing 
price in this case is lower (table 5) by choosing obligation, his profit would be more.   
Table  3: Players’ Profit When Choosing FTRs as Obligation or Option $ (*p:profit) 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,1 
592.05
59 
53.802
9 
0 
364.18
88 
5.1286 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,1 694.46 64.077 0.6426 315.21 1.0882 
00 1 94 
𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,2 
163.88
27 
4.5442 0 
86.692
4 
79.737
0 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,2 
158.75
09 
4.5193 1.4291 
86.692
4 
81.674
0 
𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,3 
92.689
8 
15.456
9 
0 
204.52
60 
0.8149 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,3 
90.057
1 
15.379
8 
0.9488 
204.52
60 
0.0814
2 
𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,4 
-
53.5526 
-
16.5900 
0 
-
131.447 
0 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,4 
-
215.340 
-
16.5989 
0.0115 
-
82.4536 
4.4067 
𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,5 
-
294.344 
-
14.1617 
0 
-
60.0880 
10.166
6 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,5 
-
227.694 
-
25.0169 
-3.7353 
-
76.5785 
7.7633 
𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑙,6 
27.920
3 
7.9899 0 
292.30
31 
27.429
6 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡,6 
27.064
4 
7.9496 0.5910 
308.76
88 
27.403
9 
 
 
  
Optimal bids for players considering each of two above mentioned states are listed in 
table 4. Proposed bids for options are more than bids for obligations and this is because of FTR 
option inherence which is more expensive and less risky based on (44). Market clearing prices for 
both option and obligation FTRs are also collected in table 5.   
Table  4: Optimal Bids for Each Player When Choosing FTRs as Option or Obligation 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,1 
15.625
9 
3.8579 0 
19.467
6 
9.1501 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,1 
73.001
8 
7.6313 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,2 
11.092
0 
3.4378 0 
14.557
7 
9.1501 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,2 
71.992
4 
7.4518 0.5602 
91.962
3 
16.684
0 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,3 
15.625
9 
3.3938 0 
19.467
9 
9.1503 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,3 
73.001
8 
7.6486 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,4 
15.625
9 
3.8579 0 
19.467
6 
9.1501 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,4 
73.001
8 
7.6313 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,5 
17.633
2 
3.8579 0 
19.467
6 
9.1501 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,5 
73.001
8 
7.6313 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑏𝑙,6 
15.626
0 
3.4351 0 
19.467
6 
11.299
8 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡,6 
73.001
8 
7.5326 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
 
 
  
Finally, Fig. 2, shows final profit and players’ decisions in selecting FTRs obligation or 
option based on table 3. It implies that players generally tends to bid FTR obligation on lines 1, 2 
and 11 while it is reverse for lines 8 and 10.   
Table  5: MCPs for FTR Obligations and Options $/MW 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑏𝑙,1 
15.625
9 
3.8579 0 
19.467
6 
9.1501 
𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡,1 
73.001
8 
7.6313 0.5602 
91.985
9 
16.684
0 
 
 
    
Table  6: FTRs for Obligation and Option Each State 
    
Line 1 2 8 10 11 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,1 7.7315 5.8676 0 3.7775 2.0722 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,1 8.9491 7.0524 3.9667 3.2696 1.8584 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,2 2.4201 0.5604 0 1.0169 4.8036 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,2 2.4201 0.5604 1.9761 1.0169 4.9090 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,3 1.2104 1.7301 0 2.1214 0.0446 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,3 1.2104 1.7301 1.1933 2.1214 0.0446 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,4 2.1127 0.0010 0 0 0 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,4 0 0 0.0142 0.5082 0.2354 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,5 0 1.1838 0 1.0851 0.5416 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,5 0.8952 0 0 0.9141 0.4146 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑙,6 0.3646 0.9759 0 3.0319 1.4611 
𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡,6 0.3646 0.9759 0.8025 3.2027 1.4611 
 
 
   
   
Figure  2: Players’ Profits and Their Decisions To Buy FTR Option or Obligatoin on Each Line 
   
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The transmission market is designed to help its participants to hedge congestion charges. 
The most common instruments applied in this market are FTRs. FTR is an effective tool for 
hedging congestion charges in the electricity markets. Due to ambiguities and the corresponding 
risks of participation in market and the decision making process, determining the optimum 
purchase of FTR is difficult for players. A bi-level model has been proposed for calculating the 
optimum pricing strategy in the FTR auction markets. The upper-level sub-problem has been 
modelled separately as a problem for maximizing the profit based on risk for individual bidders. 
The lower-level sub-problem is also implemented based on a FTR market settlement problem for 
ISO. The bi-level problem has been solved based on sensitivity functions. By means of new 
metrics and parameters such as maximum and minimum amount of FTRs, offering prices and 
chance coefficients, the three questions that each player faces in the market are answered by 
the evolutionary game theory approach. Eventually, a test network is used to implement the 
proposed algorithm and the Nash equilibrium is obtained. An eight bus system has been 
simulated for investigating the performance of the proposed method. The obtained results 
showed the pricing differences between FTR obligation and option. The paper has shown that 
the congestion constraints might cause the pricing tender to be more attractive to certain 
bidders. Furthermore, the obtained results showed that an exact prediction of LMP difference 
and the adequate risk efficiency could play a significant role in FTR pricing and the bidders’ 
profits. 
 
7  Appendix 
  
7.1  Appendix A 
 
Suppose that 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡  is the initial generalized generation factor of slack bus at balance 
equilibrium point. Based on [21] it can be written as below;  
 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡 =
𝑝𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 −∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑠𝑙𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑖𝑃𝑖
∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖
 (59) 
 
When generator 𝑗 dispatches to supply load 𝑑, power flow on line between nodes 𝑙 
and 𝑘 definitely faces one of the below conditions; 
1) If [(𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑)Δ𝑃𝑗] − [𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 ] < 0 then;  
 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 + [(𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑)Δ𝑃𝑗] (60) 
 
2) If [(𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑)Δ𝑃𝑗] − [𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 ] > 0 then; 
 
 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥  (61) 
 
Base on each of the above conditions 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1  can be calculated. Therefore, for the both 
of them, the conditions are analyzed. 
Suppose that first condition is satisfied, then it can be written; 
 
 
𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1 =
1
∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖+Δ𝑃𝑗
(𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 + ((𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑)Δ𝑃𝑗) −
∑𝑁𝐺𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑠𝑙 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑖𝑃𝑖 − 𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗Δ𝑃𝑗)
 (62) 
 Substituting (59) into (62) results in; 
 
 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1 =
𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡 ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖−𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑑Δ𝑃𝑗
∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖+Δ𝑃𝑗
 (63) 
 
Therefore the difference between 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1  and 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡  easily would be obtained. 
2) Consider that second condition is true then we have; 
 
 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1 =
𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑠𝑙𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑖𝑃𝑖−𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗Δ𝑃𝑗
∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖+Δ𝑃𝑗
 (64) 
 
After some manipulations; 
 
 𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡+1 =
𝐷𝑙−𝑘,𝑠𝑙
𝑖𝑡 ∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖+(𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑙−𝑘
𝑖𝑡 −𝐴𝑙−𝑘,𝑗Δ𝑃𝑗)
∑
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖+Δ𝑃𝑗
 (65) 
 
In this situation like the first condition the difference is earned apparently. 
 7.2  Appendix B 
 
To solve a bi-level optimization as below, KKT optimality condition of the lower level must 
be added to the higher level problem [32]−[34]. 
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝐹(𝑥𝑖)  , 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
𝑆. 𝑇.
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑓(𝑥𝑖)
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 𝑏 → 𝜇𝑖
𝑒𝑞
𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑥𝑖 → 𝜇𝑖
−
𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 → 𝜇𝑖
+
↓ 𝐾𝐾𝑡
▽𝑥𝑖 𝐿 =
𝜕𝑓(𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
− 𝜇𝑖
𝑒𝑞𝑎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖
+ − 𝜇𝑖
− = 0
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 𝑏
𝜇𝑖
−(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 0
𝑥𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜇𝑖
+𝑠𝑖 = 0
𝜇𝑖
−, 𝜇𝑖
+, 𝜇𝑖
𝑒𝑞, 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0
 (66) 
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